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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
RANDALL PUGMIRE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 940610-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-
2a-3(2)(f) (1994 as Amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The first issue is whether Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503 (2) 
as defined by Utah Code Annotated 76-10-501 (2) (a) (Supp. 1988), 
is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case. 
In reviewing a legislative enactment, the Court presumes 
that it is constitutional. Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 
169 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 8 (Utah 1991); Provo City Corp. v. State, 
795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990). The void-for-vagueness 
doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define an, 
. offense with sufficient definitiveness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983), Greenwood v. North 
Salt Lake, supra. "It is a basic principle of due process that 
an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not 
clearly defined." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 
(1972). The issue of vagueness was preserved at the trial court 
set forth in the Defendants trial memorandum (R. 30-33). 
The second issue is that there is insufficient evidence to 
prove that the knife seized from the Defendant was a dangerous 
weapon and that the Defendant had the requisite intent to commit 
the crime. On appeal, the appellate court will reverse a 
criminal conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence is so inclusive or so inherently improbable that 
"reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that 
the Defendant committed the crime. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 
84 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 
1983); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). 
The issue of the sufficiency of the evidence was preserved 
at the trial court level (R. 30-33, 74 at 82-86). 
STATUTES RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
There are several statutes which are important in the 
consideration of the issues on appeal in this case. The 
Defendant was charged with Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a 
Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated 76-10-503 (2) (1953 as Amended). That statute is 
as follows: 
(a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a 
felony may not have in his possession or under his 
custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in 
2 
this part* 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty 
of a third degree felony, but if the dangerous weapon 
is a firearm, explosive, or incendiary device he is 
guilty of a second degree felony. 
The definition of a "dangerous weapon" is contained in Utah 
Code Annotated 76-10-501 (2) (c) (1953 as Amended): 
"Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner 
of its use or intended use is capable of causing death 
or serious bodily injury. The following factors shall 
be used in determining whether an item, object or thing 
not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a 
dangerous weapon: 
(i) the character of the instrument, object, 
or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any; 
and 
(iii) the manner of which the instrument, object, 
or thing was used. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE 
1. The Information was filed in this case on February 10, 
1994 and charged the Defendant with four counts: 
Count I: Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol 
and/or drugs, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44 (1953 as Amended). 
Count II: Open Container in a Motor Vehicle, a 
3 
Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated 41-6-44.20 (1953 as Amended). 
Count III: Driving on Suspension, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
41-2-136 (1953 as Amended). 
Count IV: Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a 
Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503 (2). 
R. 1-2. 
2. After a preliminary hearing on February 23, 1994, the 
matter was bound over to the District Court on Counts I, II, and 
IV. Count III, Driving on Suspension was dismissed (R. 10, 15). 
3. The Defendant was arraigned in District Court on April 
14, 1994. The Defendant entered not-guilty pleas to the charges 
(R. 26). 
4. The matter was tried to Judge Boyd L. Park, sitting 
without a jury, on May 23, 1994. After a presentation of the 
evidence, Judge Park dismissed Count I, Driving Under the 
Influence (R. 34-35, 45-48). Based upon the Defendant's 
admission, the court found the Defendant guilty of Open Container 
in a Motor Vehicle, a Class B Misdemeanor. The court also found 
the Defendant guilty of Count IV, Possession of a Dangerous 
Weapon by a Restricted Person (R. 39-42). 
5. The Defendant was sentenced and a Judgment and Order of 
Probation was entered on September 8, 1994. On Count II, Open 
Container, the Defendant was sentenced to the Utah County Jail 
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for a period of 90 days. On Count III, Possession of a Dangerous 
Weapon by a Restricted Person, the court sentenced the Defendant 
to the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five years. 
The court ordered that the two terms were to run concurrently. 
Execution of the sentence was suspended and the Defendant was 
placed on probation for a period of 36 months. Part of the 
Defendant's sentence included the Defendant serving 120 days in 
the County Jail and the payment of various fines and assessments 
(R. 51-52). 
6. The Notice of Appeal was filed on October 6, 1994 (R. 
69-70). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant was found guilty on only two counts, Open 
Container and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted 
Person. The Defendant does not contest the court's findings with 
regard to the open container and therefore only the facts 
relevant to the charge of possession a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person are set out herein. 
1. On February 8, 1994, Provo City Police Officers were 
dispatched to the residence of the Defendant's ex-wife, Rexine 
Esplin, where the Defendant was involved in an altercation with 
Jerry Knight, Rexine1s boyfriend (R. 74, at 39-41). 
2. At the time the Defendant was searched by the officers 
before being placed in the police car, Officer Grossgebauer 
retrieved a knife from the Defendant. The knife was described 
by the officer as a "buckknife" that folded into the handle and 
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was approximately 4 inches in length (R. 74, at 44). The knife 
was not used or taken from the Defendant's pocket during the 
altercation. 
3. The Defendant's testimony regarding the knife was 
proffered. The proffer was that the knife was a buckknife, four 
inches in length, that folded back into the body of the knife (R. 
74, at 85). 
4. The court, in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law ruled as follows with regard to the charge: 
(1) UCA 76-10-503 (2) (a) provides as follows: "Any 
person who is on parole for a felony or is incarcerated 
at the Utah State Prison or other like facility may not 
have in his possession or under his custody or control 
any dangerous weapon as defined in this part. 
UCA 76-10-501 (2) (a) "'Dangerous Weapon' means any 
item that in the manner of its use or intended use is 
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. In 
construing whether an item, object, or thing not 
commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous 
weapon, the character of the instrument, object, or 
thing; the character of the wound produced, if any; 
and the manner in which the instrument, object, or 
thing was used are determinative." 
(2) The appellate courts of this state have not 
directly ruled on what constitutes a pocket knife, nor 
what dimensions a knife must be in order to constitute 
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four and one-half inches and the blade extending from 
the knife when opened is three-quarters inches to four 
inches, depending on the measurement from the rounded 
handle to the tip of the blade. This court is of the 
opinion that this is the type of knife ordinarily 
used by game hunters for the purpose of cutting the 
throat, cleaning, skinning or dismembering game 
animals. The blade of the knife is in a locked 
position when fully opened. 
(4) The court concludes that this knife is not an 
ordinary pocket knife, that the intended use of the 
knife is capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury and is a dangerous weapon under the provisions 
of UCA 76-10-501 (2) (a). 
(5) The court finds the defendant guilty, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, of count 4 of the Information: 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted 
Person, a Third Degree Felony. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Appellate Courts have previously determined that 
the statute in question is facially constitutional. However, it 
is clear that the definition of "dangerous weapon" is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case. 
The characteristics of the knife found on the Defendant are 
consistent with ordinary pocket knives and other household and 
sporting utensils. There are simply insufficient facts upon 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: AS
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CODE ANNOTATED 76-10-503 (2) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
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definitioi I ui "dangerous weapon11 is unconstitutionally vague as 
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it does not give notice of the prohibited behavior with 
sufficient specificity, as required by Article I, Section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the United 
States Constitution. It is also the Defendant's contention that 
the malleable nature of the definitional statute renders it an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the courts, 
pursuant to Article 5, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
This Court reviews a legislative enactment with the 
presumption that it is constitutional. State v. Archambeau, 820 
P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Greenwood v. City of North Salt 
Lake, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 8 (Utah 1991); Provo City v. State, 
795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990). 
As enunciated by the Utah Appellate Courts, the void-for-
vagueness doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define 
an: 
Offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary 
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and 
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. 
Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). In addition, the 
Utah Appellate Courts have held that there is "the requirement 
that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement." Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 
574 (1974). As noted in State v. Archambeau, supra, "it is a 
basic principle of due process that the enactment is void for 
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." See also 
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76-10-503 (2), as defined by Utah Code Annotated 76-10-501 (2) 
(a) is facially constitutional. See State v. Archambeau, supra. 
The Defendant contends that the statutes, as applied to the facts 
of this case are unconstitutional. Prior to the Court's decision 
in State v. Archambeau, supra, the Utah Appellate Courts had 
determined that an unloaded firearm (that was capable of being 
loaded and fired), was a "dangerous weapon" under the statute 
(State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985), and that a 
screwdriver, used to commit an assault, could be construed as a 
dangerous weapon (State v. Walker, 765 P.2d 874 (Utah 1988). 
In State v. Archambeau, supra, the Court was faced with an 
examination of various knives, a blowgun and blow darts. In 
Archambeau, the Defendant's parole officers confiscated a 10-
inch knife, with a 5 and a half inch blade and a 10-inch bowie 
knife with a 6-inch blade, a 48-inch blowgun and blow darts. Id. 
As with this case, there was no evidence that the Defendant 
Archambeau had used or was intending to use the items in a 
dangerous manner. Id. 
The Court started its analysis by stating that items thought 
to be dangerous weapons may be analyzed in two ways. First, " 
'dangerous weapon1 means any item that in the manner of its use 
or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily 
harm." Utah Code Annotated 76-10-501 (2) (a) (Supp. 1088). 
Importantly, the Court noted that this definition suggests that 
any item capable of creating harm is a dangerous weapon, 
"including a hunting rifle, a butcher knife, or a knitting 
12 
n e e d l e . " Id* 
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was specifically put on notice by his parole officers 
that they considered these items dangerous weapons and 
that he was prohibited by law from possessing them 
while on parole* Defendant was, thus, on notice that 
he was unlawfully in possession of dangerous weapons. 
Section 76-10-503 (2), as defined by Section 76-10-501 
(2) (a) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
the Defendant. 
Id. 
As contrasted with the facts in State v. Archebeau, supra, 
the Defendant in this case was never told by law enforcement 
officials or his probation officer that possession of the knife 
was a violation of his probation or of the statutes set out 
above. The Court of Appeals went to great lengths in Archembeau 
to point out that the knives and blowgun were previously 
confiscated as dangerous weapons by Archembeau's probation 
officer and returned to him only with the understanding that the 
items would be released to a cousin and not to the Defendant. 
The Defendant in this case had no warning or guidelines 
established for him. 
As opposed to the two 10-inch knives and blowgun, the 
Defendant in this case had possession of a knife measuring 4 and 
7/8-inch handle and a 4 and 1/2-inch blade (R. 39-40). Although 
the Court in State v. Clevidence, 153 Ariz. 295, 736 P. 2d 379, 
385 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), held that a knife could be considered 
a dangerous weapon, most courts would disagree. In California, 
14 
the possession of a "dirk or dagger" is prohibited by statute 
under similar circumstances to those described by the Utah 
statute by a restricted person. In People v. Forrest,, 432 P.2d 
374 (Cal. 1967), the court held that an oversized pocket knife, 
not designed primarily for stabbing, was not, as a matter of law, 
a "dirk or dagger." See also, People v. Bain, 489 P.2d 564 (Cal. 
1971). The Hawaii Supreme Court in State v. Giltner, 537 P.2d 
14 (Hawaii, 1975) held that a diver's knife consisting of a hard 
rubber handle with a blade measuring slightly less than 6 and 1/2 
inches in length , one edge being serrated for most of its 
length and then curved convexley to the point, was not a 
"dagger" within the meaning of a statute prohibiting a persons 
from carrying a dagger concealed on his person. 
In interpreting the Hawaii statute, the court noted that the 
intent was to bring within the statute's ambit, instruments 
closely associated with criminal activity whose sole design and 
purpose is to inflect bodily injury or death on another human 
being. State v. Rackle, 523 P.2d 299 (Hawaii 1974). 
The Oregon court in State v. Pruett, 586 P.2d 800 (Ore. App. 
1978), rules that a "sportsman's knife" which had a 3 and 1/2-
inch blade which folded manually into handle but locked when in 
a fully opened position was an "ordinary pocket knife" under any 
construction which might reasonable be given a similar state. 
The Nevada court in Bradvice v. State, 760 P.2d 139 (Nev. 
1988), held that a knife which had a blade less than 2-inches 
along the sharpened edge and whose total length of the opened 
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blade was 5 and 3/4-inches, although the blade would lock into 
place, was not a "dagger" or "dirk" for purposes of statute 
prohibiting a concealed possessions of dirk, daggers or 
dangerous knives. 
The statute in this case does not define all knives as 
dangerous weapons. As noted by the decisions outlined above, 
there are knives with such a length and shape that a reasonable 
person would conclude that the same was an instrument designed 
primarily for stabbing. Courts have looked to the length of the 
blade, the presence of a serrated edge and other similar 
characteristics. In this case, none of the characteristics 
relied upon by other courts are present. 
The difficulty of determining what knives are acceptable 
under Utah statutory scheme is almost impossible. The Court in 
Archembeau, noted that possession of a butcher knife is 
acceptable. However, a butcher's knife may have a blade of over 
12-inches. Knives are found as attachments to household tools 
intended for uses such as cutting wire, insulation, glass and 
other material. Generic pocket knives are also sold for that 
purpose. Even closer to call are the category of "sportsmen's 
knives." Although a convicted felon is prohibited from hunting 
with a gun, a felon is allowed to fish, trap, dive and accompany 
relatives on rifle and gun hunts. It cannot seriously be argued 
that' a knife purchased for household chores, fishing and other 
similar tasks could be considered a dangerous weapon without a 
more explicit prohibition in the statute. If the statute was 
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interpreted to reach knives in general because of an existence of 
a sharp edge alone, the list of other household implements that 
would fit the same criteria is endless. The ban would then reach 
everything from table utensils to automotive tools, knitting and 
sewing equipment and general sporting equipment. 
It is respectfully submitted that the relatively small size 
of the knife in question, the numerous legitimate uses of such a 
knife and the lack of any prior warning to the Defendant mandate 
a finding that the relevant statutes are unconstitutionally vague 
as applied to the Defendant. Although a statute must have 
reasonable breadth and flexibility, as applied to this case, the 
statute does not convey "sufficiently definitive standards, to 
put a reasonable person on notice of prohibited conduct." 
Greyned v. City of Rockford# supra; In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 
1088 (Utah 1981); State v. Pilcher, 636 P.2d 470, 471 (Utah 
1981); State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979). 
Although the question of whether a 10 or 12-inch blade with 
a serrated edge may be easier, a folding 4 1/2-inch blade cannot 
be singled out as somehow being inherently dangerous. Every 
characteristics of the Defendant's knife is duplicated by 
instruments and tools used and possessed by most citizens during 
the course of regular chores and sporting activities. Given the 
close association of the Defendant's knife with other household 
instruments, the Defendant's knife cannot be singled out as an 
inherent "dangerous weapon." 
The difficulty of determining the breadth of the Utah 
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statute is highlighted by the trial court's decision. Judge Park 
held that the knife in question was a "type of knife ordinarily 
used by game hunters. . . ." (R. 39). Judge Park concluded that 
the knife was not an ordinary pocket knife (R. 39). The question 
is to asked is what relationship exists between the trial court's 
finding and the verdict. A felon is allowed to hunt, fish and 
dive. Additionally, he is allowed to accompany friends and 
family on gun and rifle hunts. A felon is clearly allowed to 
clean game of all kinds and butcher meat. Therefore, the use 
found by the Court for the knife, namely game and hunting 
related, are not purposes that are prohibited activities for 
felons or persons on probation. 
Additionally, judge Park's findings assume that if the knife 
were only a normal pocket knife, there would be no crime. 
However, there is no criteria to determine what an "ordinary 
pocket knife" is. Is a blade of three inches acceptable. Does 
it matter if the blade can be folded into the handle, if the 
blade is serrated and whether the blade locks in an open 
position. Can an ordinary pocket knife be stored in a scabbard 
and does criminality attach if it is so carried. Obviously, what 
is a normal pocket knife is a matter that would differ among 
individuals depending on their experience and training. A person 
who is comfortable in performing chores around the house and 
participates in sporting and outdoor activities may select a 
knife that can be used for all purposes. Even a person who does 
not hunt but camps may select a knife similar to the defendants 
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that can be used to shave leaves from limbs, construct tent pegs, 
cut rope and be useful in other camping tasks. What is 
"ordinary" is a function of the person's lifestyle and there was 
absolutely no evidence establishing that the knife was 
inconsistent with the Defendant's regular and legal work and 
pleasure enterprises. 
Certainly as applied to the facts of this case, the statute 
is vague and impossible to apply fairly. 
POINT II: THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF POSSESSING A DANGEROUS 
WEAPON. 
This Court is obligated to reverse the conviction for 
insufficient evidence when the evidence is so inconclusive or so 
inherently improbable that "reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt" that the Defendant committed the 
crime." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 84 (Utah App. 1990); State 
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). 
The only case which the Utah Appellate Court has had an 
opportunity to review a conviction of possession of a dangerous 
weapon that involved a knife was in State v. Archembeau, 820 P.2d 
920 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991). As outlined above, Archembeau, had the 
two 10-inch knives and blowgun confiscated by his probation 
officer. The knives and blowgun were returned to Archembeau on 
the condition that they would be turned over to his cousin. 
Additionally, the court had before it two 10-inch knives and a 
blowgun and darts. The court was presented with expert testimony 
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regarding the damage that a blowgun dart can do to a human being. 
In ruling on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, the 
Court stated: 
We agree with the State that there was ample evidence 
to prove that Defendant's knives and blowgun are 
objectively the type of instruments reasonable people 
would assume were dangerous weapons, as they were 
objectively the type of weapons which are capable of 
causing death or serious bodily injury. Furthermore, 
according to the trial testimony of parole agents 
present during the May, 1988 search of Defendant's 
home, Defendant was told that his knives and 
blowgun were being seized at that time because the 
agents considered them restricted, dangerous weapons 
Defendant was forbidden from possessing while on 
parole. 
In a footnote, the Court noted that the fact that the knives 
and blowgun "found themselves back in his [the Defendant 
Archembeau] possession seems to the Court [was] done at his own 
risk. He knew why they were taken and removed from him in the 
first instance." Id. 
As contrasted with State v. Archembeau, the facts in this 
case do not support the conviction. As opposed to two 10-inch 
knives, the Defendant in this case had one knife with a 4 1/2-
inch blade. The knife did not have a serrated edge or other 
indicia of a dagger whose purpose is to inflict injury on another 
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human being* No lay or expert testimony was offered regarding 
the difference between the knife found on the Defendant and 
regular pocket knives or sporting or other household items. The 
trial court's conclusion that a knife with a 4 1/2-inch blade is 
a dangerous weapon while a pocket knife and other similar items 
are not was totally arbitrary. In the court's findings, Judge 
Park simply concluded without any basis that: 
This court is of the opinion that this is the 
type of knife ordinarily used by game hunters for the 
purpose of cutting the throat, cleaning, skinning or 
dismembering game animals . . . . 
R. 39. 
As noted in the previous point, Utah law does not prohibit a 
"restricted person" from fishing, trapping, diving or 
accompanying others on rifle hunts. Further, Utah law does not 
prohibit a "restricted person" from cleaning game. Accordingly, 
the finding of Judge Park is irrelevant to the question and 
certainly did not describe conduct that is prohibited by 
"restricted persons." The trial court made no findings that the 
knife had peculiar traits or characteristics that made it a 
dangerous weapon to be used against human beings. 
Finally, there was no evidence that the Defendant had ever 
been warned or cautioned with regard to the knife in question. 
The Defendant simply had no knowledge or information that his 
possession of a folding knife was violative of the law. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-2-101 (1983 as Amended) provides as 
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follows: 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his 
conduct is prohibited by law and; 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, 
with criminal negligence, or with a mental state 
otherwise specified in the statute defining the 
offense, as the definition of the offense 
requires . . . . 
Utah Code Annotated 76-2-102 (1983 as Amended) then provide: 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall 
require a culpable mental state, and when the 
definition of the offense does not specify a culpable 
mental state, and the offense does not involve strict 
liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall 
suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An 
offense shall involve strict liability if the statute 
defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative 
purpose to impose criminal responsibility for 
commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute 
without requiring proof of any culpable mental state. 
Even under the lowest category of intent, reckless is 
described as: 
Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and 
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unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exists 
or the result will occur . . . . 
Although intent to commit a crime may be found from 
proof of facts from which the fact finder reasonably could 
believe, there is no such basis in this case. State v. McClain, 
706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985). The Defendant was not advised that 
possession of the item in question or other similar instruments 
could be a violation of the law. The knife was not one that a 
reasonable person would believe constituted a generic "dangerous 
weapon." Even the trial court only found that the knife could be 
used in sporting activities and made no finding that the knife 
was otherwise dangerous. There is simply nothing in the evidence 
from which intent of the Defendant to violate the law can be 
extracted. The evidence is simply insufficient to establish that 
the knife in question is a dangerous weapon or that the Defendant 
had the requisite intent to violate the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Although this Court has found that the statutes defining a 
"dangerous weapon" are facially constitutional, the issues of the 
statute's vagueness based upon the particular facts of a case has 
remained open. The knife found on the Defendant was a short 
bladed knife that had a large number of legitimate purposes and 
did not have the general characteristics of "daggers" such as 
much longer blades, serrated edges and the like. The Defendant 
had never been cautioned or warned about possession of the knife 
in question or other similar instruments. 
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The evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
sustain a finding that the knife in question was dangerous or 
that the Defendant intended to violate the law. 
Accordingly, the conviction of the Defendant for possessing 
a dangerous weapon should be reversed. 
DATED this \L- day of December, 1994. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
and VERDICT 
CASE NO. 941400119 
DATE May 27, 1994 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
CLERK: LHH 
This matter came before the Court for trial on May 23, 1994. Deputy Utah County 
Attorney Sherry Ragan appeared for and on behalf of the State of Utah. The defendant was 
present and represented by Mike Petro, Esq. 
The defendant, in open court, waived his right to a jury trial and requested a bench 
trial. The plaintiff did not object. 
The court accepted a stipulation of the parties regarding the testimony of witness Ron 
Carlson, who was then excused. 
The following witnesses were called by the plaintiff and sworn and testified, to-wit: 
Jerry Knight, Rexine Esplin and Officer Weinmuller. The court received exhibit 1. The 
plaintiff rested after which, the defendant moved the court to dismiss count 1: Driving Under 
the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs. The plaintiff responded to the motion. The court granted 
the motion and dismissed count 1: Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, a Third 
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Degree Felony. Mr. Petro was directed to prepare findings and conclusions consistent with 
the court's granting of the motion to dismiss. 
Regarding count 2: Open Container in a Motor Vehicle, a Class A Misdemeanor the 
defendant admitted his guilt, and the court made a finding that the defendant was guilty of 
Open Container in a Motor Vehicle, a Class A Misdemeanor. 
Regarding count 4 of the Information: Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a 
Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony, the defendant advised the court that he would not 
put on any testimony and admitted to the court that on or about February 8, 1994, in Utah 
County, Utah, the defendant was on probation for a felony and had in his possession at that 
time a knife. The defendant handed to the court a prepared Trial Memorandum Argument 
and asked that the court receive the Trial Memorandum Argument with regard to count 4 of 
the Information. The plaintiff requested a short time in which to respond and the court 
received the Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count IV of the 
Information on May 26, 1994. The court being fully advised in the premises now makes the 
following findings, conclusions and renders a verdict: 
1. UCA 76-10-503 (2) (a) provides as follows: "Any person who is on parole for a felony 
or is incarcerated at the Utah State Prison or other like facility may not have in his 
possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part. 
UCA 76-10-501 (2) (a) "'Dangerous Weapon' means any item that in the manner of its 
use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. In construing 
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whether an item, object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a 
dangerous weapon, the character of the instrument, object, or thing; the character of the 
wound produced, if any; and the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used 
are determinative." 
2. The appellate courts of this state have not directly ruled on what constitutes a pocket 
knife, nor what dimensions a knife must be in order to constitute a dangerous weapon. 
Counsel for the defendant has furnished the court with citations to cases in California, 
Hawaii, Oregon and Nevada which have considered what constitutes an ordinary pocket knife 
and what type of a knife would be considered a dangerous weapon or a dagger or a dirk for 
purposes of the particular state's statute. The cases cited by defense counsel are somewhat 
enlightening but not particularly helpful with regard to the Utah statute. 
3. A personal examination of the knife found on the defendant at the time of his arrest has 
been made by the court. The parties agreed that the court could view the knife and the court 
has taken the liberty of marking the knife as exhibit #6. The knife itself, in this court's 
view, is not what one would consider an ordinary pocket knife. The knife is very large and 
very heavy to be carried in one's pocket. It is a knife that would ordinarily be carried in a 
scabbard. The knife is a "buck" knife 110. It consists of a large and mostly metal handle 
being four and seven-eighths inches in length and ranges in width from one and one-eighth 
inches on one end of the handle to seven-eighths inches on the blade end of the handle. The 
actual blade of the knife is a large heavy-duty blade which is seven-eighths inches wide at its 
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widest point tapering to a point on the end of the blade. The blade is well sharpened and the 
total length of the blade is four and one-half inches and the blade extending from the knife 
when opened is three and three-quarters inches to four inches, depending on the measurement 
from the rounded handle to the tip of the blade. This court is of the opinion that this is the 
type of knife ordinarily used by game hunters for the purpose of cutting the throat, cleaning, 
skinning or dismembering game animals. The blade of the knife is in a locked position when 
fully opened. 
4. The court concludes that this knife is not an ordinary pocket knife, that the intended use 
of the knife is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and is a dangerous weapon 
under the provisions of UCA 76-10-501 (2) (a). 
5. The court finds the defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of count 4 of the 
Information: Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a Third Degree 
Felony. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 27th day of May, 1994. 
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